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Coy v. Iowa: A Constitutional Right of Intimidation
I. INTRODUCTION
Peter was six years old when a babysitter ordered him and his 3- and 4-
year-old brothers to their basement. The sitter threatened them with a knife,
forced them to disrobe, and sexually assaulted Peter's little brothers. Police
recovered the knife, with fingerprints of the suspect.
At the trial, despite sensitive questioning and careful use of anatomical
dolls, Peter's brothers were unable to describe the assault. Peter was called to
testify. Peter had seemed bright and articulate when, an hour earlier, he had
visited the courtroom for orientation by the district attorney. Now, before the
jury, he said nothing. He seemed confused and frightened, his eyes darting
around the courtroom, his small body lost on what must have seemed an enor-
mous chair. Peter nodded quickly when the judge said, 'I'll bet you'd feel
much better if you were sitting on your Dad's lap.' When his father sat in the
witness chair and put Peter on his lap with his arm around Peter's tummy,
Peter answered all questions about the sexual assaults.1
Prosecutors and legislatures have been responding to the public's
demand for action against the rising number of child sexual abuse
cases. 2 Prosecutors continue to file more charges and lawmakers ur-
1. Brief of Ainicus Curiae Judge Charles B. Schudson for appellee at 4a-5a, Coy
v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988) (No. 86-6757) [hereinafter Schudson]. Judge Schudson is
a member of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges. He presides
over Branch I of the Wisconsin Circuit Court for Milwaukee County and has traveled
extensively throughout the United States lecturing about the laws and techniques
emerging in the area of child witness testimony. Id. at 1-2. Judge Schudson has au-
thored several works on this subject. Id. at 2 n.2. For seven years, prior to assuming
his present role on the bench, Judge Schudson worked as both a federal and state
prosecutor. Id. at 2. His specialty concerned cases of battered women, patients of nurs-
ing homes, and victims experiencing difficulty appearing or communicating in court.
Id.
2. See State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 22, 697 P.2d 836, 841 (1985). Statistics indicate a
200% increase in the number of child sexual abuse cases reported between 1976 and
1983. Approximately 25,000 cases were reported annually by 1980. Estimates of the
number of cases that never get reported are speculated to be as high as 500,000 annu-
ally. Id. See generally Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in State Legisla-
tion and Other Emerging Legal Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 89 DICK. L. REV.
645 (1985) (discussing increasing legislative reform and other measures taken to more
competently deal with child sexual abuse cases because of the greater awareness of
this abuse and higher number of reported cases); Parker, The Rights of Child Wit-
nesses: Is the Court a Protector or Perpetrator?, 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 643 (1982) (dis-
cussing the problems inherent within the legal system of prosecuting child sexual
abuse cases, providing legislative guidelines and precedential authority developed to al-
leviate the problem, and assessing the contemplated constitutional questions that will
be raised by such legislation); Comment, Children's Testimony in Sexual Abuse Cases:
Ohio's Proposed Legislation, 19 AKRON L. REV. 441 (1986) (discussing the prevalent
gently draft legislation3 aimed at reducing the trauma suffered by the
child victim. 4 However, a looming disruption to these efforts is the
need for additional legislation, its relationship to the confrontation clause, and the con-
stitutionality of the proposed legislation).
3. Prosecutors are filing "fatter" indictments and informations against accused
sexual offenders in response to the public's cry for relief. Graham, Indicia of Reliabil-
ity and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecu-
tions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 19, 20 (1985). Legislatures have responded by creating more
hearsay exceptions and passing laws designed to make prosecution of child sexual
abuse cases more effective and less stressful for the child victim. Id. at 20-21.
State statutes and case law have attempted to make the victim's testimonial experi-
ence in court less traumatic, without compromising the accused's constitutional guar-
antees under the sixth amendment. One-way closed-circuit television, one-way screen
and one-way mirror statutes: ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-4253 (Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (West Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 92.54 (West Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-37-4-8 (Burns Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West Supp. 1988) (formerly
§ 910A.3); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1558 (1986); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(1)-(3)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrfll Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West Supp. 1988);
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
278, § 16D (West Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4) (West 1988); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 13-1-405 (Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4 (West Supp. 1988); N.Y.
CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 65.10 (McKinney Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753 (West
Supp. 1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 5982-5985 (Purdon Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1988); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 3 (Vernon Supp.
1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (Supp. 1988); VT. R. EVID. 807 (1983).
Two-way closed circuit television statutes: CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp.
1989); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 65.00 to 65.30 (McKinney Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2907.41(C), (D), & (E) (Anderson 1987); HAW. R. EVID. 616 (codified at HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 626-1 (1985)); VT. R. EVID. 807 (1983).
Videotape deposition and testimony given before trial: State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J.
Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (Law Div. 1984); ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1988); ALASKA
STAT. § 12.45.047 (1984); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4251, 13-4253(B)-(C) (Supp. 1988);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-44-203 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1989); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-413, 18-6-401.3 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (West Supp.
1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53 (West Supp. 1988);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (Burns 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (Supp. 1988);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3433 to -3434 (Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(4)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:440.3-440.5 (West Supp.
1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (West Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 278, § 16D(b)(2) (West Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4) (West 1988); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 13-1-407 (Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 491.675-.690 (Vernon Supp.
1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-15-401 to -403 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.227 (1987);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (Supp. 1988);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41 (A), (B), (D), & (E) (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 753(C) (West Supp. 1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 5982, 5984 (Purdon
Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(G)
(Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 24-116 (Supp. 1988); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.071, § 3 (Vernon Supp.
1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5(3), (4) (Supp. 1988); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 967.04(7)-
(10) (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 7-11-408 (1987); VT. R. EVID. 807 (1983).
4. See Generally Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in
the Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977 (1969) (defining the magnitude
and scope of the harm suffered by the victim chiefly attributable to repeated court ap-
pearances and examining the difficulties in effectuating adequate pretrial interrogation
of the child); Vartabedian, Striking a Delicate Balance, 24 JUDGES' J. 16 (Fall 1985)
(discussing the issues associated with the clash between the needs of the sexually
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confrontation clause as enunciated in the sixth amendment.5
While legislative reform6 has been warmly received by the public,
courts remain ever wary of the defendant's constitutional guaran-
tees.7 A recent decision by the Supreme Courts may frustrate the op-
eration of scores of state statutes designed to ease the trauma
suffered by child victims of sexual abuse when they testify against
their alleged assailant;9 such statutes were also enacted to aid the
prosecutors in bringing these sexual abusers to justice.1 0
abused child witness and the criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to confront
his accuser).
5. The sixth amendment guarantees to each defendant that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. Specifically, the definition of sexual abuse of a child has been expanded, stat-
utes of limitation have been lengthened, procedural and evidentiary rules have been
amended, and closed-circuit television statutes have been created. See, e.g., CAL. EVID.
CODE § 767(b) (West Supp. 1989) (allows leading questions to be asked of sexually
abused children under ten years of age); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1989)
(authorizing contemporaneous examination and cross-examination outside of the
courtroom by the use of two-way, closed-circuit television transmission); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 9A.64.020, 9A.04.080 (West 1988) (1982 amendments expanding the defi-
nition of incest, and extending the statute of limitations); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§§ 950.055(2), 971.105 (West Supp. 1988) (providing for the trial to be conducted in lan-
guage that the abused child can comprehend and further requiring the court and the
district attorney exercise appropriate measures to ensure a speedy trial for the purpose
of reducing the trauma suffered by the child witness).
7. "Political passion often obscures the reality that as the offensiveness of the
crime increases, so too do prosecutorial zeal, the ignominy of conviction, and the need
to guard against wrongful prosecution." Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex
Abuse Prosecution: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 808 (1985).
8. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988). Shortly before the Supreme Court heard
Coy, the legal community worried that "if the Iowa procedure is struck down, the
[C]ourt's action will have negative ramifications for more widely used alternative pro-
cedures, such as testimony by closed-circuit [television]." Coyle, Application of Con-
frontation Clause, a Difficult Issue in Child Abuse Cases, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 2, 1987, at 1,
col. 2.
9. Note, The Constitutionality of the Use of Two-Way Closed Circuit Television
to Take Testimony of Child Victims of Sex Crimes, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 995, 997
(1985); Comment, "Face-to Television Screen- to Face": Testimony by Closed-Circuit
Television in Cases of Alleged Child Abuse and the Confrontation Right, 76 Ky. L.J.
273, 275-76 (1987); Comment, Child Witnesses in Sexual Abuse Criminal Proceedings:
Their Capabilities, Special Problems, and Proposals for Reform, 13 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 157 (1985).
10. [A] system, designed to bring the abuser to justice, in reality further
abuses the victim. Additionally, the abuser often goes free because, without
the child's testimony, the evidence is insufficient to convict him.... Clearly, a
system that traumatizes child victims and does not convict their abusers in-
fringes on the public interest. The ... procedures enacted in Utah and other
states are designed to address these problems.
Comment, Videotaping the Testimony of an Abused Child. Necessary Protection for
the Child or Unwarranted Compromise of the Defendant's Constitutional Rights?, 1986
Although the existence of the right of confrontation is not dis-
puted,"1 the scope of this right is the source of numerous argu-
ments.12 Defendants vigorously contend that intrinsic to the right is
the element of face-to-face confrontation.' 3 Indeed, lower courts
have found violations of the sixth amendment when the defendant
was precluded from actually viewing the testimony of an opposing
child witness because of unorthodox seating arrangements 14 or an
overcrowded courtroom.15 However, in cases with highly similar fact
situations, courts have also found no injury to the defendant's right
of confrontation.16
The scope argument also arises when the alleged violation to the
confrontation clause stems from conditions emanating from outside
the courtroom. Specifically, in cases concerning prosecution for sex-
ual abuse of a minor, introduction of the minor's testimony by elec-
tronic means did not deny the defendant his right of confrontation.' 7
UTAH L. REV. 461, 465-66; see also Note, The Revision of Article 38.071 After Long v.
State: The Troubles of a Child Shield Law in Texas, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 268 (1988).
11. In federal court, the right stems from the sixth amendment. The same right
exists in state court because the right of confrontation has been made applicable to the
states as a fundamental right through the fourteenth amendment. Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400, 403-05 (1965).
12. Annotation, Conditions Interfering With Accused's View of Witness as Viola-
tion of Right of Confrontation, 19 A.L.R. 4TH 1286, 1287 (1983).
13. Id.
14. A California appellate court held that altering the seating arrangement in the
courtroom to prevent the witness and the defendant from seeing each other denied the
defendant his right to confront witnesses against him. Herbert v. Superior Court, 117
Cal. App. 3d 661, 668, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850, 853 (1981).
15. The Utah judiciary found that a defendant's right to confront witnesses against
him included the right of face-to-face confrontation. This right was consequently vio-
lated when a defendant was forced to sit in the back of the courtroom while a six-year-
old girl testified to the corpus delicti of the alleged crime. State v. Mannion, 19 Utah
505, 511-13, 57 P. 542, 543-44 (1899).
16. The California Supreme Court held that the defendant's right to confront wit-
nesses was not abridged even though the desk of the clerk of the court partially
blocked the defendant's view of each testifying witness. People v. Garcia, 2 Cal. 2d 673,
682, 42 P.2d 1013, 1017 (1935). Defendant's request to move the court's furniture was
denied and no prejudice resulted because defendant was present at all times and no
complaint was ever raised evidencing the defendant's inability to hear the testimony of
each witness. Id.; accord Palmer v. State, 134 Tex. Crim. 390, 392, 115 S.W.2d 641, 642
(1938) (holding that the defendant was afforded sufficient opportunity to confront wit-
nesses against him, despite the fact that the witness stand was constructed in such a
way as to prevent the defendant from seeing the entire body of each witness during
their occupation of the witness stand).
17. The New Jersey judiciary allowed a child victim to testify via contemporane-
ous videotape transmission into the courtroom from a nearby room. State v. Sheppard,
484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 1984). The court expressly held that the videotape
procedure would not inhibit the defendant's right of confrontation, even though the
defendant was only afforded "electronic" confrontation as opposed to "physical" con-
frontation. Id. at 1348-49; accord People v. Algarin, 129 Misc. 2d 1016, 1019, 498
N.Y.S.2d 977, 979 (1986) (permitting the child victim's testimony to be introduced via
two-way closed-circuit television effectuated an appropriate balance between the inter-
ests of the child victim and the defendant).
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Yet, in another case dealing with the same type of offense, the elec-
tronically transmitted testimony of the child victim from another
part of the courthouse, although contemporaneous with the trial it-
self, was held to be violative of the defendant's right of
confrontation.18
This note will briefly examine the history and development of the
confrontation clause as embodied in the sixth amendment to the
United States Constitution. Additionally, a summary and analysis of
the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions written in Coy v.
Iowa19 will be offered. Finally, this note proposes that the decision
of the majority represents a gross departure from sound legal reason-
ing, frustrates the lawful, legislative efforts of a vast majority of
states and ignores the pleas from the public to help bring the sexual
abusers of our nation's children to justice. In effect, the Supreme
Court has created a constitutional right of intimidation.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The right to. confrontation results from experience over the centuries that
there is no better way to ascertain the truth when factual issues are dis-
puted.... [Further], this,... [right] is not peculiar to the mid-twentieth cen-
tury. The ... [right] existed over 2,000 years ago when the Roman Emperor
Trajan advised his Governor that "anonymous accusations must not be admit-
ted in evidence" against "a new sect known as Christians." 20
Some argue that by the time our nation's Constitution was adopted,
the right to confront one's accusers, face-to-face, was already consid-
ered essential to determine the veracity of the accusations levied.21
However, the sixth amendment is devoid of any explicit language
granting an accused the right of face-to-face confrontation.22 In Mat-
tox v. United States,23 the Supreme Court held that a defendant's
18. State v. Warford, 223 Neb. 368, 376-77, 389 N.W.2d 575, 581-82 (1986). The de-
fendant had no way of communicating with his attorney during the cross-examination
of the child witness nor did he have a full view of the child or his attorney throughout
the cross-examination.
19. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
20. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB. L.
381, 413 (1959) (citing O'BRIAN, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 62
(1955)).
21. Comment, Preserving the Child Sexual Abuse Victim's Testimony: Videotap-
ing is Not the Answer, 1987 DET. C. L. REV. 469, 495.
22. See supra note 5. In fact, the confrontation clause was submitted without de-
bate in either house of Congress. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 176 (1970). There-
fore, the determination of the legislature's intent in drafting the clause can only be
achieved through a review of case law.
23. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
sixth amendment right to confrontation is not absolute and therefore
"must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the
necessities of the case." 24 Further, the Court stated that the primary
function of the confrontation clause was to prohibit the use of ex
parte affidavits in place of live witness testimony and cross-examina-
tion.25 The Court clearly stated that while the right of face-to-face
confrontation exists, the defendant is not a party to the confronta-
tion.26 Rather, the defendant is merely afforded the right to compel
adverse witnesses to testify while standing face-to-face with the jury
so that the witness's credibility and veracity may be determined.27
In Kirby v. United States,28 decided four years after Mattox, the
Supreme Court expressly granted criminal defendants the right to
look at testifying, opposing witnesses. 29 However, Mattox was still
applicable and the sixth amendment right of confrontation had not
become absolute.30 Mattox remains controlling today and is still cited
for the proposition that confrontation rights may be abridged in cer-
tain instances. 31  Similarly, in Dowdell v. United States,32 the
Supreme Court found that a provision in the Philippine Bill of
Rights, patterned after the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution, specifically included the right of face-to-face
confrontation. 33
In 1931, the Supreme Court decided that the right of cross-exami-
24. Id. at 243. For a brief discussion of the recognized exceptions to the confronta-
tion clause, see infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
25. "The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent
depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases,
[from] being used against the prisoner in lieu of personal examination and cross-exam-
ination ...." Id. at 242.
26. [The accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and
sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to
face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his de-
meanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether he is worthy of belief.
Id. at 242-43 (emphasis added).
27. Id.
28. 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
29. Id. at 55. Specifically, the Court stated that a defendant may be convicted only
upon evidence established through "witnesses who confront him at the trial, upon
whom he can look while being tried, whom he is entitled to cross-examine, and whose
testimony he may impeach .... Id. (emphasis added).
30. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Additionally, while the Kirby court
clearly gives the defendant the right to look at his accusers, this right was not violated
in Coy. The defendant was able to see the two sexually molested girls while they testi-
fied. These witnesses were the only two that had their vision obstructed by the screen
authorized under section 910A.14 of the Iowa Code. The extent of the obstruction was
minimal. The girls could see everyone in the courtroom except the defendant.
31. See supra note 24; see itnfra note 169.
32. 221 U.S. 325 (1911).
33. Id at 329-30. The court stated: "This provision of the statute intends to secure
the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned,
by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial." Id. at 330.
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nation, embodied in the sixth amendment, was so fundamental to our
jurisprudence as to be "one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial
[in federal court]."3 4 By this time, the Court had articulated two pur-
poses of the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment: (1) the de-
fendant's right to see his accusers in court, face-to-face, and (2) the
defendant's right to cross-examine all witnesses against him.35 The
Court further anticipated that the two functions of the confrontation
clause, as written in the federal Constitution, would soon become ap-
plicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment.3 6 This hypothe-
sis was affirmed in 1965 when the Court held that the confrontation
clause of the sixth amendment "reflects the belief of the Framers...
that confrontation was a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in
a criminal prosecution." 37 Therefore, the sixth amendment was
made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.3 8
Until the mid-1960's, the confrontation clause cases decided by the
Supreme Court stressed two important concepts: the criminal defend-
ant's right to cross-examine all witnesses against him was para-
mount,39 but his right to be present at any adverse criminal
proceeding was merely derivative.40 In 1968, the Supreme Court in
Barber v. Page4 l reaffirmed its earlier holding: confrontation means
both the right to cross-examine witnesses and the opportunity to
compel each adverse witness to testify while standing face-to-face
with the jury.42
Two years later, in 1970, the Supreme Court listed three vital pur-
poses served by the confrontation clause.43 These purposes included:
(1) ensuring that testimony of a witness would be given only while
under oath; (2) ensuring that any testifying witness would be subject
to cross-examination; and (3) ensuring that the jury may view any
witness, while testifying, to analyze that witness's demeanor for the
34. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931).
35. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934), overruled on other grounds by
Malloy. v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
36. I
37. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
38. Id. at 406.
39. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965).
40. Note, supra note 9, at 1006-07 (citing Douglas, 380 U.S. at 418; Pointer, 380 U.S.
at 406-07). Wigmore concurs that the primary function of the confrontation clause is
for the purpose of cross-examination, "not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the wit-
ness or of being gazed upon by him." 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395 (J. Chadbourn
rev. ed. 1979).
41. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
42. I at 725; see also supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
43. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
purpose of ascertaining credibility and veracity. 44 The Court further
noted "that it is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time
of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the confronta-
tion clause."45
In Chambers v. Mississippi 46 and Ohio v. Roberts,47 the Court reaf-
firmed the Mattox rule that the sixth amendment right to confronta-
tion is not absolute.48 Whereas the clause states a preference for
face-to-face confrontation, this preference can be abridged in order to
advance an important public policy.49 The Chambers Court noted
that the defendant's right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, prefer-
ably face-to-face, should be eliminated.50 Moreover, the Roberts
Court condoned abridging the defendant's right to exclude out of
court assertions5 ' when such abrogation becomes necessary to fur-
ther important public policies. Similarly, the Court recently held
that a defendant, accused of sexual abuse of a minor, could be denied
face-to-face confrontation at a competency hearing of two child wit-
nesses because he was not denied the opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses at trial.52
A plurality of Justices again noted in 1987, in Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie,53 that inherent within the confrontation clause is the notion
that the witness be required to face the defendant.54 The defendant
in Ritchie had been tried and convicted for a number of sexual
44. Id If these three requirements formed the basis of the confrontation clause
rights today, the state of Iowa would not have abridged Mr. Coy's rights in any way.
Each of the sexually assaulted girls testified under oath, was subjected to cross-exami-
nation, and was in full view of the jury during the entire time in which she offered her
testimony. See State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Iowa 1986).
45. Green, 399 U.S. at 157 (emphasis added). As the dissent in Coy pointed out, the
procedure used at Coy's trial, pursuant to the Iowa statute, did not violate any of the
purposes of the confrontation clause as enumerated in Green. See infra notes 134-36
and accompanying text.
46. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
47. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
48. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
49. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63-64; Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295. The dissent in Coy be-
lieved that the policy advanced by Iowa suffices as an interest capable of abridging the
defendant's confrontation rights. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2805, 2806 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
50. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295. "Whatever validity the 'voucher' rule may once
have enjoyed, and apart from whatever usefulness it retains today in the civil trial pro-
cess, it bears little present relationship to the realities of the criminal process." Id. at
296.
51. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63-65. The Court held that the defendant could not ex-
clude Anita's statements because "the prosecution carried its burden of demonstrating
that Anita was Constitutionally unavailable for purposes of respondent's trial." Id. at
77.
52. Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (1987).
53. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
54. Id. at 51.
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crimes against a child.55 The Court decided that the right of confron-
tation allows a defendant the opportunity for effective cross-exami-
nation as opposed to cross-examination ultimately effective through
any means the defendant may choose to employ.56
The rights granted to the criminal defendant by the confrontation
clause are accompanied by a host of exceptions denying that defend-
ant full protection in a variety of situations.57 Many of these excep-
tions to the judicially developed reading of the confrontation clause
existed long before Congress adopted the sixth amendment in 1791.
Moreover, in no way do these exceptions clash with the spirit of the
clause.5 8 In fact, in Mattox, the Court specifically stated that it must
interpret the confrontation clause in the context of that law as it ex-
isted at the time of the adoption of the sixth amendment.59 Other
exceptions to the mandate of the confrontation clause have been de-
lineated by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the clause when
balanced against principles of justice.60 A defendant can waive the
right to confront adverse witnesses by failing to appear at trial,61 by
disrupting the proceedings so drastically that the defendant's removal
is required to continue the trial,62 by general misconduct, 63 by intimi-
dating the witness,6 4 or by pleading guilty.6 5 Additionally, a vast as-
sortment of hearsay evidence is admissible without violating the
rights within the confrontation clause.66 However, the Court's deci-
55. Id. at 43-44.
56. Id. at 53. The scope of the right of cross-examination is limited to the extent
that the defendant has had an adequate occasion on which to cross-examine. There-
fore, provided a defendant's reasonable questioning of an adverse witness commences
and progresses unimpeded, the right of confrontation has not been abridged. The dis-
sent in Coy noted that the recognized rights embodied in the confrontation clause were
not violated. See inqfra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
57. Most notable is the explanation in the Mattox opinion that the defendant's
confrontation clause rights may be restricted if outweighed by a competing policy in-
terest. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895). See generally Griswold, The
Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 713-15 (1971) (trac-
ing the development of judicial interpretation of the confrontation clause).
58. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
59. Id.
60. Note, supra note 9, at 1009.
61. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 445 (1912).
62. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, reh'g denied, 398 U.S. 915 (1970).
63. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934).
64. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359-60 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 914 (1977).
65. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
66. The numerous hearsay exceptions to the confrontation clause are outside the
scope of this article. See generally, Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemp-
tions from the Constitutional Unavailability Requirement, 70 MINN. L. REV. 665
sion in Cox v. Iowa specifically excludes from these confrontation
clause exceptions the operation of a shield statute. Thus, absent a
sufficient showing of need to protect the child, a child witness must
physically and visually confront the defendant while testifying.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
On the afternoon of August 2, 1985, C.B.67 began fashioning a
home-made tent out of two toppled ping-pong tables.6 8 The tent was
built in the back yard, just a few feet from the back door of C.B.'s
house.69 Both C.B. and her father thought it odd that the next door
neighbor, John Avery Coy,70 had watched the young girl tailor her
campsite. 71
At about 9:00 p.m., C.B. and her friend, N.C., ventured into the
backyard with sleeping bags, pillows, soda pop, two plastic cups, a
battery-powered flashlight, and an electronic game. The girls drank
some soda, played the game, and went to sleep.72 Some time later,
the assailant entered the tent, grabbed the girls by the throats and
told them not to scream or he would "knock [them] out." 73 The girls
were directed to remove their clothes, at which time they were fon-
dled repeatedly by their attacker.74 The assailant removed his own
clothes, lay down between the two girls and started kissing them. He
then forced the girls to engage in oral sex with him and later di-
(1986); Myers, Hearsay Statements by the Child Abuse Victim, 38 BAYLOR L. REv. 775
(1986); Note, Victimizing the Child Victim: Vermont Rule of Evidence 807 and
Trauma in the Courtroom, 11 VT. L. REv. 631 (1986).
67. Appellee's Brief at 3, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988) (No. 86-6757) [herein-
after Brie]]; see also Trial Transcript at 73, Coy (No. 86-6757) [hereinafter Transcript].
In an attempt to preserve the anonymity of the girls, their names were redacted and
replaced by initials. Consequently, the victims' names appear nowhere in the record.
Additionally, the father of one of the abused girls is referred to only by initials as well.
68. Brief, supra note 67, at 3; see also Transcript, supra note 67 at 73. A blanket,
draped over the top, completed the design. Id.
69. State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1986). The backyard was encircled by trees,
and the tent could not be seen from the street. Brie, supra note 67, at 3; see also Tran-
script, supra note 67, at 302, 314. The only other vantage point from where the make-
shift fort could be seen was from next door, where the defendant lived. Brief, supra
note 67, at 3.
70. John Avery Coy was the accused assailant, the defendant in the trial court,
and the appellant in the Iowa State Supreme Court as well as the United States
Supreme Court. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2799-2800.
71. State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Iowa 1986). Coy was rarely seen in his back-
yard, but on the afternoon of August 2, 1985, he sat in a chair and intently watched
C.B. construct her tent. Brief supra note 67, at 3; see also Transcript, supra note 67, at
314.
72. Brief, supra note 67, at 3; see also, Transcript, supra note 67, at 38-41, 80.
73. Brief, supra note 67, at 3. The attacker remarked that he had expected to find
only one girl in the tent, not two. Id; see also Transcript, supra note 67, at 41, 81.
74. Brief, supra note 67, at 3; see also Transcript, supra note 67, at 41-42, 81-82.
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rected them to kiss each other "and act like they were enjoying it."7s
Shortly thereafter, while lying between the two girls, the assailant
admonished them to tell nobody.7 6 Next, the assailant began his
search for a means of escape which would alert no one.77
At 6:00 a.m., approximately fifteen minutes after the assailant had
fled, the girls ran into the house and reported the incident to C.B.'s
parents.7 8 C.B.'s father told the police that he suspected Coy of the
crime because Coy was the only other person who knew of the back-
yard campsite.7 9 While the police questioned Coy, a background
check revealed an outstanding arrest warrant had been issued for
Coy's detention.8 0 Coy was subsequently arrested and taken into cus-
tody; meanwhile, the investigation continued.S1 Even though the
girls could not identify Coy as their attacker,8 2 the evidence linking
75. Brief, supra note 67, at 3-4; see also Transcript, supra note 67, at 43, 84, 90.
Next, the offender requested that the victims urinate on his face, but neither of the
two could do so. Thereafter, the assailant urinated into one of the plastic cups that the
girls had brought with them. Brief, supra note 67, at 4.
76. Brief, supra note 67, at 4; see also Transcript, supra note 67, at 45-46, 85. The
attacker cautioned his victims that they would "go through a lot" if they told a soul.
Brief, supra note 67, at 4. Fortunately, the warning did not deter the girls from re-
porting the crime immediately. Id. Their swift action played a vital part in Iowa's con-
viction of the defendant. However, the Supreme Court's holding frustrates the states'
attempts to contain the ever-increasing crimes of child abuse. See supra note 2 and
accompanying text.
77. Brief, supra note 67, at 4; see also Transcript, supra note 67, at 45, 85. The
girls were ordered to lie on their backs and were then tied together with C.B.'s jogging
pants. Brief, supra note 67, at 4. After having assaulted the girls for about ninety min-
utes, the assailant left the tent, but he warned the girls that he would return immedi-
ately. Id
78. State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 731-32 (Iowa 1986). The girls were taken to the
hospital for a medical examination and the police were called immediately. Id. at 732.
79. Id, Armed with this information, the police soon found Coy leaving his home
with a suitcase. Before Coy could leave, the police began asking him questions regard-
ing the sexual assault of the two girls. Id
80. Id Although the warrant was based on a traffic violation, the officer fulfilled
his duty by efficiently and properly arresting Coy and taking him into police custody.
I&.
81. Id C.B.'s father and a neighbor conducted their own cursory search of Coy's
residence. MdL This search was completely independent of any police involvement. Id.
The police neither asked the private citizens to conduct the search nor created any im-
permissible agency when the civilians took it upon themselves to conduct their own
search for evidence. Id. Based on the fruits of the private search and other informa-
tion linking Coy to the offense, the investigating officer obtained a search warrant for
Coy's home. IM
82. The girls' failure to identify Coy as the offender resulted from the following
facts: (1) the tent in which the girls were assaulted was very dark; (2) the girls were
strictly directed not to look at the assailant; (3) a flashlight was shined in their eyes
whenever the girls tried to look at the molester; (4) the attacker wore a stocking over
Coy to the crime was overwhelming.8 3
B. Iowa's Treatment
The Iowa trial court found Coy guilty of two counts of engaging in
lascivious acts with children.8 4 To secure the testimony of the two
abused girls, the prosecution moved, pursuant to a newly enacted
statute,8 5 to have their testimony offered to the court via closed-cir-
cuit television or from behind a one-way screen.8 6 The trial court ap-
proved the use of the screen; however, it would not allow the closed-
circuit television procedure to be employed.8 7 Coy strongly objected
to the use of the screen on two grounds.SS First, he claimed the
screen violated his rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment.8 9 Second, he claimed that its presence alone denied him
due process of law by turning a presumption of innocence into a pre-
sumption of guilt.90 The trial court found against Coy on both claims
and the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed.91
his head during the assault. Brief, supra note 67, at 4-5; see also Transcript, supra note
67, at 46-49, 52, 59-60, 86-89, 96-97.
83. The following list includes some of the key items of evidence which connected
Coy to the assault: (1) The girls' noticed that the attacker had worn his watch high on
his forearm, almost to his elbow, with the face turned inward towards his body. When
the police arrested Coy, he was wearing his watch in a similar fashion. (2) The flash-
light initially brought into the tent by the girls, and used by the assailant to shine in
the girls' eyes to prevent identification, was found in Coy's garage containing his fin-
gerprints. (3) The batteries used by the girls in the flashlight and in the electronic
game were also found in Coy's garage. (4) One of the plastic cups, brought to the tent
by the girls and smelling of urine, was found in the trashcan inside the backdoor of
Coy's house. (5) Pubic hairs not matching either girl were found in the bedding used
in the tent. (6) A head hair, unlike that of either of the victims, and highly similar to
Coy's, was found in the girls' shorts. Brief, supra note 67, at 5; see also Transcript,
supra note 67, at 139, 141, 146, 149, 199-201.
84. State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730 (1986). This crime is prohibited by Iowa Code sec-
tion 709.8(1). IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.8(1) (1985).
85. Section 910A.14 of the Iowa Code provides, in part:
The court may require a party be confined to an adjacent room or behind a
screen or mirror that permits the party to see and hear the child during the
child's testimony, but does not allow the child to see or hear the party. How-
ever, if a party is so confined, the court shall take measures to insure that the
party and counsel can confer during the testimony and shall inform the child
that the party can see and hear the child during testimony.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West Supp. 1988).
86. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2799 (1988).
87. The trial judge felt that the screen "seem[ed] the more moderate and least ob-
trusive approach." Joint Appendix of Trial Transcript at 6, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798
(1988) (No. 86-6757).
88. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2799.
89. Id.
90. Id
91. Id. Although the trial court rejected Coy's due process argument, the judge
did charge the jury that no inference was to be drawn from the presence of the screen
during part of the trial proceedings. Id at 2799-2800.
Notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States was filed on March 5,
1987. Probable jurisdiction was noted on June 26, 1987. Jurisdiction was invoked
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia,92 writing for the majority, held that the sixth
amendment affords a criminal defendant the right to confront ad-
verse witnesses face-to-face. 93 The Court also determined that the
prosecution's screen, used during the trial to make testifying bearable
for C.B. and N.C., violated Coy's right to confront witnesses face-to-
face. 94 Finally, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the
Iowa judiciary because the state's supreme court failed to address the
issue of harmless error.95
In an attempt to prove that an actual face-to-face meeting between
the defendant and his accuser is required in all criminal trials,96 and
has always been required,9 7 the majority referred to a panoply of his-
torical derivations of the confrontation clause.98 Justice Scalia as-
serted that the purpose of providing the references from the near
and distant past was to communicate his feeling that face-to-face con-
frontation, as an essential means to a fair trial, is a concept of human
under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2). On November 23, 1987, oral argument was set for January
13, 1988. On June 29, 1988, the Supreme Court decided the case.
92. Joining Justice Scalia were Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Stevens, and
O'Connor.
93. "[The Court has] never doubted . .. that the confrontation clause guarantees
the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact."
Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2798, 2800 (1988); see Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2668 (1987)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
94. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802-03; see also supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
95. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803. Justice Scalia complains that the Iowa Supreme Court
failed to determine whether the violation to the confrontation clause was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). The ab-
sence of this analysis from Iowa Supreme Court Chief Justice Reynoldson's opinion is
easily explained by the fact that the state judicial system found no violation of the con-
frontation clause; therefore, such analysis was unnecessary.
96. The majority does recognize that the confrontation clause may be skirted away
when the defendant's rights lose on balance with an important public policy. Coy, 108
S. Ct. at 2803.
97. See supra note 95.
98. "There are indications that a right of confrontation existed under Roman law."
Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800. "It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to
die before the accused has met his accusers face to face, and has been given a chance to
defend himself against the charges." Id. (quoting Acts 25:16). In addition, by address-
ing the Latin derivation of "confront," the Court found the right exists "[s]imply as a
matter of Latin .... " Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800. "Then call them to our presence-face-
to-face, and frowning brow to brow, ourselves will hear the accuser and the accused
freely speak .... " Id. (quoting Shakespeare, Richard II, act 1, scene 1). "President
Eisenhower once described face-to-face confrontation as a part of the code of his home
town of Abilene, Kansas." Id. at 2801. The phrase still persists: "Look me in the eye
when you say that." Id.
nature.99 Based on this historical review and the colloquial phrase,
"[ilt is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person 'to his face'
than 'behind his back,"'lo Justice Scalia found that a criminal de-
fendant must be afforded the right of face-to-face confrontation with
all adverse witnesses.io l
The Court qualified this holding slightly by remarking that a wit-
ness is not compelled to actually make eye-contact with the defend-
ant.1 0 2 However, a witness's failure to fix his eyes on the accused is
subject to the constellation of inferences possibly drawn by a reason-
able jury. 03 This reason, coupled with the element of cross-examina-
tion, is said to combine forces to guarantee the integrity of our
American system of justice.i0 4 Apparently, the majority realized the
adverse affect that this holding will have on "the truthful rape victim
or abused child; but by the same token it may confound and undo the
false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult."10 5
The Court's holding that criminal defendants must have the oppor-
99. Id, at 2802.
100. Id.
101. Id The majority believed and asserted that a lie told about a person to that
person's face will often be told less convincingly, as opposed to a lie told about a person
behind that person's back. Id No authority is cited for this proposition. Presumably,
the Court wants the American public to accept this assertion by finding support in that
concept of human nature mentioned in the text accompanying note 99.
102. Id. This assertion defeats the majority's position. The heart of Coy's com-
plaint is that the testifying girls cannot see him. The screen merely achieves, with a
one-way mirror, what the girls could easily secure by themselves by hiding their eyes,
thus safely avoiding eye contact with the defendant. The net effect of these proce-
dures is identical. The method employed by the Iowa judiciary, pursuant to recent leg-
islation, simply aided the court in seeking the truth by respecting the legitimate fear
experienced by the two child victims. Therefore, the screen procedure caused no more
damage to a criminal defendant's confrontation clause rights than the testimony given
by a witness who receives court permission to hide her eyes while testifying.
103. Id. The majority implied that an accusing witness at trial, who refuses to
make eye contact with the accused, is more likely to be lying than the gallant witness
who defiantly chooses to stare down the defendant. Again, no legal authority or statis-
tics were offered to substantiate this assertion.
The same behavior is susceptible to numerous other interpretations. The majority
chose to refer only to those which discredit witness testimony. The author asserts that
an equal number of reasonable interpretations may be gleaned from this behavior,
which effectively buttress the witness's credibility. For example, such behavior may
suggest that her fear of the defendant is genuine and that the accused is the guilty
party.
104. Id. (citing Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2662 (1987)). Justice Scalia
points out that Iowa can hardly disagree that the import of a face-to-face meeting be-
tween defendant and witness, in the case at bar, will have a "profound effect" on the
witness's testimony. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802.
105. I& This statement must be based on the majority's feeling that concern over
the health and safety of our children is either (1) a concern not "firmly rooted in our
jurisprudence" (i& at 2803 (citing Bourjaly v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2783
(1987)), or (2) a concern not of sufficient importance to warrant a partial, minor in-
fringement of the defendant's confrontation clause rights. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
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tunity to confront adverse witnesses face-to-face06 made it easier to
resolve the second issue: whether the screen violated Coy's right to
confrontation. The screen, employed by Iowa's prosecutor, was uti-
lized for the specific purpose of preventing either of the abused girls
from seeing the accused.1 07 Additionally, the judge in the trial court
personally sat in the witness chair and determined that the shield
successfully attained this objective.0s Therefore, because of the pre-
clusion of eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation, the Court found a viola-
tion of the defendant's confrontation rights.09 The prosecution
argued that the defendant's right to confrontation was outweighed by
the state's interest in safeguarding its children against sexual
abuse.11 0 However, the majority disposed of this argument by com-
menting that historically the Court has infringed on a defendant's
confrontation rights only when the rights in question were "reason-
ably implicit,"1ii as opposed to the narrow and express rights that
are clearly set forth in the confrontation clause.112 The Court fur-
ther stated that the search for conditions which would justify deny-
106. See supra note 93.
107. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802.
108. Joint Appendix of Trial Transcript at 10-11, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988)
(No. 86-6757). Additionally, the judge sat at the defense table while someone sat in the
witness stand, and he determined that the defendant would be able to see the child
witnesses. I& at 10.109. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802. It should be noted that the Iowa statute which pro-
vided for the placement of the screen was not held to be unconstitutional. See infra
note 191 and accompanying text.
110. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802. This argument is based on the notion that the confron-
tation clause rights are not absolute and must be abridged should the facts of a particu-
lar case mandate. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895); see also supra note
24 and accompanying text; see also infra note 128 and accompanying text.
111. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802. In Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973), the
Court reversed a state court's guilty verdict because the defendant was denied the op-
portunity to cross-examine an adverse witness. In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-65
(1980), the Court found that the preliminary hearing testimony of a now unavailable
witness could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule over the defendant's
complaint that he was denied the right to cross-examine the witness. In Kentucky v.
Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (1987), the Court held that the defendant's confrontation
clause rights were not abridged when the defendant was denied the opportunity to be
present at a competency hearing for two child witnesses against him.
112. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802. Justice Scalia's reasoning is premised on the notion
that some confrontation clause rights are more important than others. He maintains
that those rights narrowly defined and clearly set forth in the confrontation clause are
never waived, regardless of the competing social policy at stake. Such a rationale is
devoid of any merit or authority. Whereas some confrontation clause rights may be
more essential than others, depending on the facts of a certain case; the determination
of whether to abridge one of these rights rests with an analysis of the importance of
the conflicting social policy when balanced against the challenged right. There is no
authority for Justice Scalia's implied assertion that only those confrontation rights not
ing the defendant the right of face-to-face confrontation would
necessarily be decided later.113
Iowa asserted another argument designed to demonstrate that the
circumstances of this particular case justified depriving the defendant
of his right of face-to-face confrontation.1n4 Specifically, the prosecu-
tion argued that the state statute itself, which authorized the place-
ment of the screen, was sufficient evidence of the legislature's
concern for reducing the trauma suffered by child witnesses.I 15 How-
ever, the demise of this argument resulted from the failure to make a
sufficient showing of an important policy interest.11 6 Ultimately, the
majority refrained from deciding the defendant's due process claim
because the violation of Coy's right of face-to-face confrontation pro-
vided sufficient justification for the Court's decision.11 7
B. The Concurring Opinion
Justice O'Connor, 18 while agreeing with the majority, wrote sepa-
rately to stress the fact that the guarantees of the confrontation
clause must occasionally be set aside for the purposes of furthering
an important policy interest.11 9 However, she asserted that Iowa did
not present a showing of need sufficient to abridge the defendant's
narrowly and clearly set forth in the language of the sixth amendment can be
abridged. Id. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 2803. Justice Scalia's language seems to evidence his disbelief as to
whether "any exceptions exist." Id. (emphasis added). Justice Scalia does recognize
that conditions may arise which would permit abridging the defendant's confrontation
clause rights. Id. Those conditions would naturally include the protection of a vital
public interest. Id. (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980); Chambers v. Missis-
sippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)).
114. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
115. Id.
116. Id. The majority opined that more evidence relating to the seriousness of the
trauma suffered by sexually abused child witnesses was needed to add strength to
Iowa's argument. Id. Justice Scalia's reasoning was that exceptions to the confronta-
tion clause, which are not "firmly ... rooted in our jurisprudence" require a greater
showing of need than the alleged "legislatively imposed presumption of trauma" cre-
ated by the existence of the child shield statute. Id. (citing Bourjaly v. United States,
107 S. Ct. 2775, 2783 (1987)). Scalia further stated that the 1985 statute could not be
considered firmly rooted. Id.
However, this reliance on the concept of "firmly... rooted in our jurisprudence" is
misplaced. "[T]he concept of firmly rooted should not be synonymous with longevity."
Goldman, Not So "Firmly Rooted": Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C.L.
REV. 1, 12 (1987). Additionally, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, recently stated that
"'firmly rooted' does not turn upon how long the rule has been accepted but rather
how solidly it is grounded on considerations of reliability and trustworthiness-the
very reason for the right of confrontation." State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 709-10, 370
N.W.2d 745, 759 (1985). Therefore, Justice Scalia's assertion that the 1985 Iowa statute
representing legislative evidence of concern for the trauma suffered by abused child
witnesses cannot be firmly rooted is subject to question.
117. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
118. Joining Justice O'Connor's concurrence was Justice White.
119. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803 (0' Connor, J., concurring).
[Vol. 16: 709, 1989] Coy v. Iowa
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
rights so' as to justify the denial of face-to-face confrontation. 120
Justice O'Connor's concurrence more closely examined the societal
interests competing with Coy's sixth amendment rights. 2 1 Justice
O'Connor reviewed the contemporary protective statutes and posited
that such legislation is the result of many states' attempts to shield
sexually abused children from the rigors of the courtroom.122 Justice
O'Connor agreed with the dissent that the protection of sexually
abused child witnesses is a policy of sufficient importance to justify
the creation of an exception to the confrontation clause.'
2 3
Significantly, Justice O'Connor stressed "that nothing in today's
decision necessarily dooms such efforts by state legislatures to pro-
tect child witnesses."12 4 While supporters of Iowa's position may dis-
agree with Justice O'Connor's analysis, perhaps they may find solace
in the Court's failure to declare the Iowa statute unconstitutional. 125
Many of today's statutes are free from the constitutional infirmity
which plagued section 910A.14 of the Iowa Code.126 Additionally,
those statutes which inherently violate the confrontation clause may
120. Id. Justice O'Connor feels that reliance on the legislature's general concern
for child abuse victims is not sufficient to infringe upon the defendant's right of con-
frontation. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Some of the child shield statutes require a
case-by-case determination of necessity and thereby prohibit automatic, broad applica-
tion and ultimately result in fewer infringements on defendants' confrontation rights.
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(d)(1) (West Supp.
1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54(4) (West Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 278,
§ 16D(b)(1) (West Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4(b) (West Supp. 1988).
121. Coy, 108 S. Ct. 2803-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor points out
that as recently as the previous term a plurality of justices recognized that child abuse
is one of the most difficult crimes to spot and prosecute, largely because the sexually
abused child is the only witness. Id, at 2803-04 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Penn-
sylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987); accord, Meyers, Little Witnesses, STUDENT
LAW., Sept. 1982, at 15; Note, supra note 7, at 806-07; Note, Should a Two Year Old
Take the Stand?, 52 Mo. L. REV. 207, 208, 221 (1987); Comment, Preserving the Child
Sexual Abuse Victim's Testimony: Videotaping is not the Answer, 1987 DET. C.L. REV.
469, 472 n.11 (citing CLARK, Family Court: Evidence in Sexual Abuse Cases, in CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE 168 (1985)).
122. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See supra note 3 for a list of
the existing, applicable state statutes and cases.
123. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
124. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The majority's opinion did
not find the Iowa statute unconstitutional. Rather, the Court held that the use of the
screen to prevent the victim from seeing the defendant in this pariticular case was a
violation of Coy's confrontation clause rights. Id at 2803.
125. Thus, legislators of a majority of the states need not be concerned at this time
about the constitutionality of their child abuse shield statutes. Rather, their concern
should focus on those statutes which affect or alter the traditional courtroom setting.
126. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Such shield laws provide for
witness testimony to be given via closed-circuit television while the defendant is pres-
ent. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1988); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp.
be valid pursuant to an exception to the clause.127 Furthermore, a
trial procedure which alters the normal methods of obtaining witness
testimony, by eliminating any face-to-face confrontation between the
defendant and the accusing witness, may be essential to promote a vi-
tal societal interest when balanced against the right of an individual
criminal defendant.128
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Blackmun's minority opinion 129 reviewed the guarantees
incorporated into the confrontation clause, 3 0 the depth of intrusion
into those guarantees,' 3 ' the majority's faulty analysis and reliance
on questionable authority,13 2 and the reasons justifying a minor in-
trusion into the defendant's confrontation rights.'33
Initially, Justice Blackmun argued that the screen placed in front
of the defendant during the testimony of the two sexually assaulted
girls did not violate any of the recognized guarantees provided by the
confrontation clause.' 34 The girls' testimony was offered under oath,
was subject to contemporaneous, adequate cross-examination, and oc-
curred in plain view of the jury. 3 5 Additionally, the statutorily au-
thorized procedure did not prevent Coy from viewing and listening to
the abused children nor did it impair his ability to confer with his at-
1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 1988); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 65.00-.30 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1988).
The Iowa statute also provides for witness testimony to be given via one-way, closed-
circuit television. IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (1987). This part of the statute was not used
despite a request by the prosecution. Transcript, supra note 67, at 2. While the trial
judge felt that the television transmission procedure and the one-way screen procedure
were unnatural, imposing alterations to the courtroom, he felt that the screen proce-
dure was less intrusive. Id at 6.
127. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor does not
make the same distinction as the majority regarding which of the rights embodied in
the confrontation clause may be abridged. Id (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also
supra note 112. Justice O'Connor makes the following two assertions: (1) A right,
even if it is considered to be at the core of the confrontation clause and therefore one
of the most important rights found therein, is not absolute; and (2) Virtually all of the
recognized exceptions to the confrontation clause involve important public policy ar-
eas. Id, at 2804-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S.
Ct. 2775 (1987); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74 (1970)).
128. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)).
129. Joining Justice Blackmun in the dissent was Chief Justice Rehnquist.
130. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
131. Id at 2806-07 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
132. Id, at 2806-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133. I& at 2808-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent states that the procedure,
authorized by state statute, in no way interferes with the "purposes of confrontation."
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
135. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see Green, 399 U.S. at 158; see
also Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986); supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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torney during the girls' testimony.136 C.B. and N.C. were notified,
pursuant to the state statute which authorized the alteration of the
courtroom, 1 37 that the accused was seated directly behind the screen
and could see and hear them while they gave their testimony. 3 8
Therefore, Coy's complaint was merely that the sexually abused girls
could not see him during their testimony. 3 9 The majority's determi-
nation that Coy's interests necessarily required protection by forcing
the two frightened, sexually molested, child victims to be able to see
him while they testified "is not borne out by logic or precedent.140
Justice Blackmun carefully noted that case law has determined
that the confrontation clause contemplates a preference for face-to-
face confrontation between witness and defendant.141 However,
136. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Moreover, the screen did not
prevent: (1) the girls and the judge from seeing and hearing each other; (2) the girls
and both counsel from seeing and hearing each other; (3) the jury from hearing the
testimony and viewing the demeanor of the girls and the defendant. Id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). The Iowa Supreme Court stated that "[t]his screen allowed Coy to see the
girls and hear their testimony but prevented them from seeing him." State v. Coy, 397
N.W.2d 730, 733 (Iowa 1986).
It was only the girls' opportunity to view the defendant which was denied. More-
over, the girls could have asked that the screen be removed. Since the testimony could
have been offered with hand-covered eyes, the net effect would have been the same.
See supra note 98. However, it seems unlikely that the majority would have found a
sixth amendment violation had the girls and the prosecution opted for the "hand over
the eyes procedure.". The Court stated that "the Confrontation Clause does not com-
pel the witness to fix his eyes upon the defendant; he may studiously look elsewhere."
Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802.
137. IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West Supp. 1988). See supra note 84 for the appli-
cable text of the statute.
138. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The statute imposes a duty
on the court to "inform the child that the party can see and hear the child during testi-
mony." IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14(1).
139. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2806. Nowhere in the history of the interpretation of the
confrontation clause had a court found that a criminal defendant had a constitutional
right to compel adverse witnesses to look at him while they testify. If this "maverick"
holding represents the majority's true intention, a number of puzzling questions arise.
For instance, is the blind witness who cannot be compelled to view the defendant now
incompetent to testify? Can a victim who prefers to look away from the defendant
during her testimony now be forced by the court to stare down the accused as a condi-
tion precedent to allowing her testimony? Suppose a prosecutor stands between the
sexually abused child witness and the accused as a tactic to lessen the victim's fears
and anxieties inherently associated with testifying in a sexual abuse case. Does the
prosecutor who effectively blocks the defendant's view of the victim, preventing the
defendant and the testifying witness from gazing upon one another, create reversible
error? Can a blind criminal defendant ever be afforded all of his rights under the con-
frontation clause?
140. Id," see supra note 139.
141. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980)).
when the relative importance of this face-to-face preference is com-
pared to the other confrontation clause rights, the faults in the ma-
jority's analysis become manifest. 42 Justice Blackmun found two
flaws in Justice Scalia's opinion regarding this preference issue.
First, the state's interest in effective prosecution of child sexual
abuse cases justifies the minor infringement into Coy's confrontation
preference.143 Second, the Court's preoccupation with whom the wit-
ness can or cannot see may distract state lawmakers from more im-
portant concerns. 144
The majority's description of Coy's complaint as revolving around
"the irreducible literal meaning of the Clause"' 45 was attacked by the
dissent.146 Additionally, Justice Scalia's insistence that the existence
of "something deep in human nature"147 mandates that a witness
must look at the accused is thoroughly without legal precedent.1 48
Justice Blackmun argued that the contrary is likely true, finding sup-
port from Professor Wigmore.149 Wigmore's discussion of the right of
confrontation considers as latent and expendable the sixth amend-
142. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2806. By the language of Roberts, the face-to-face notion em-
bodied in the confrontation clause cannot be a firm constitutional guarantee. Had the
Supreme Court wanted face-to-face confrontation to be included as one of the major
guarantees of the confrontation clause, the opinion in Roberts would have so stated.
However, the language of the opinion makes it clear that face-to-face confrontation is
nothing more than a preference. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63-64.
143. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The state's interest was rec-
ognized long ago: "Significantly, every jurisdiction has a strong interest in effective
law enforcement." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64; see also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 243 (1895).
144. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority's opinion
makes a major problem out of a minor issue. The holding could serve to divert empha-
sis away from the more important concerns of the confrontation clause, such as the
right to cross-examination or to allow the jury to ascertain veracity and credibility by
viewing the demeanor of the testifying witness. Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
145. Id at 2803.
146. Id at 2806-07 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun points out that
this characterization is erroneous and is aptly displayed by the lack of binding author-
ity to which the majority cites. Id at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Quotations from
literature, anecdotes, and dissenting opinions may be interesting and informative; how-
ever, such sources are rarely valid authority for a majority of the Supreme Court to
utilize as support for an opinion.
147. Id at 2801.
148. Id at 2807 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The common law had no such interpre-
tation of the right of confrontation. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In fact, "[t]here
never was at common law any recognized right to an indispensible thing called con-
frontation as distinguished from cross-examination." Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting); J.
WIGMORE, supra note 40, § 1397 (emphasis in original). Additionally, Wigmore, a noted
scholarly authority on the law, is imminently more persuasive than the majority's
elaboration of President Eisenhower's tales of Kansas jurisprudence. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at
2807 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
149. From the beginning of the hearsay rule in the early 1700's to the present day,
confrontation has been provided "not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness,
or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination ...... J.
WIGMORE, supra note 40, § 1395; see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1973).
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ment right to require the presence of all adverse witnesses.i50 Fur-
thermore, the prevalence of numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule
frustrates the notion that the ability to see the defendant is an essen-
tial part of the confrontation clause.151
Justice Blackmun's analysis next considered the balance between
the defendant's "preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial"152
and the state's interests, which dictate that the defendant's constitu-
tional guarantees "must occasionally give way to considerations of
public policy and the necessities of the case."'153 According to Justice
Blackmun, Iowa's concern with the alarming escalation of incidents
of child abuse, the difficulties inherent in prosecuting these cases,
and the potential harm done to the unprotected child victim wit-
ness15 4 outweighed Coy's narrow right.155
Finally, the dissent took issue with the majority's determination
that the state must establish individualized findings of necessity-
that altering the courtroom is essential to promote the child's wel-
fare.156 Justice Blackmun noted that numerous hearsay exceptions
can be employed in any sexual abuse case without an initial showing
of need solely because the procedure is statutorily based.157 More-
150. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2807 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing J. WIGMORE, supra
note 40, § 1399 (emphasis added)). A criminal defendant's right to force the testifying
witness to look at him while offering testimony is never mentioned, suggesting that
the importance of this right is subordinate even to the latent and dispensable portion
of the confrontation clause. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2807 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
151. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970), a
co-conspirator's statement was held admissible even though the declarant was not in
the courtroom and therefore could not be forced to look at the defendant while he
testified.
152. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2808 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 63 (1980)).
153. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2808 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)).
154. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2808-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra notes 1-4 and
accompanying text.
155. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). On balance with the state's
interest, Coy's grievance (that he was denied the opportunity to be in the sight of C.B.
and N.C. while they testified against him) seems trifling. Additionally, authority exists
which suggests that the reliability of the sexually abused child witness is enhanced
when measures of protection are taken to ease the child's trauma. See State v. Shep-
pard, 192 N.J. Super. 411, 416 (Law Div. 1984); Note, Parent-C7ild Incest Proof at Trial
Without Testimony in Court by the Victim, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 131 (1981).
156. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
157. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun's argument is that provisions of the
legislature which establish the requisite need to abridge the confrontation clause, and
therefore apply to all child abuse prosecutions, are the norm. Id. Therefore, no justifi-
cation exists for the majority's denial of the applicability of the child shield statute in
question.
over, the majority supported its disfavor of the placement of the
screen with the argument that because of its infancy, the 1985 Iowa
statute cannot be "firmly rooted in our jurisprudence."'158 However,
Justice Blackmun correctly stated that Justice Scalia's reliance on
the "firmly rooted" concept is misplaced.159 The concept does not ap-
ply when the reliability of the testimony offered is not in question.160
V. IMPACT
There is no constitutional right to eyeball to eyeball confrontation. The
choice of the words "face to face" may have resulted from an inability to fore-
see technological developments permitting cross-examination and confronta-
tion without physical presence.
In the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, live testimony was the only
way that a jury could observe the demeanor of a witness. The use of video
tapes does not represent a significant departure from that tradition because
the goal of providing a view of the witness's demeanor to the jury is still
achieved.
The intervention of a video screen or one-way mirror does not infringe
upon the defendant's right to confrontation. There is a difference between
confrontation and intimidation. It would be unconstitutional for the govern-
ment to take evidence in secret and outside of the presence of the defendant,
but there is no right to eyeball to eyeball presence. 16 1
The early confrontation clause cases were characterized by vigor-
ous application and strict reading.162 This treatment began to change
in the 1970's.163 The Court's resolution of California v. Green 164 and
158. Id. at 2803 (quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2783 (1987)).
159. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The concept refers only to
those out-of-court statements introduced by the government which may lack trustwor-
thiness. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In the case at bar, the girls' testimony is in no
way without the sufficient indicia of reliability because the mandate of the confronta-
tion clause was fulfilled: testimony was given under oath, within plain view of the jury,
and subject to adequate cross-examination. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also
supra note 116 and accompanying text.
160. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The remainder of the dis-
senting opinion discusses Coy's claim that the screen employed by Iowa was "inher-
ently prejudicial," and therefore violative of his constitutional right to due process of
law. Id. at 2809-10. While the dissent did not find this claim to be convincing, the ma-
jority never discussed the issue due to their holding on the confrontation clause issue.
Id. at 2803.
161. Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 230-31 (Ky. 1986) (emphasis added)
(statute allowing testimony of child abuse victim under twelve years of age to be
presented by videotape, closed-circuit television or by in-court screening held
constitutional).
162. "Early cases" refers to the time period from Mattox, decided in 1895, to
Pointer, decided in 1965. See supra notes 20-38 and accompanying text.
163. See generally Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36
U. FLA. L. REV. 207, 219 (1984) (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in the Roberts
case and its suspected effect on future confrontation clause issues).
164. 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (out-of-court statements may be admitted in court without
violating the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment as long as declarant testifies
at trial subject to cross-examination).
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Dutton v. Evans1 65 marked the beginning of this shift in the
Supreme Court's approach to confrontation clause cases.1 66 Coy is an
unexplained retreat by the Court back to pre-1970 analysis of con-
frontation clause issues. Instead of encouraging innovative court-
room techniques designed to promote the determination of the truth,
the protection of vulnerable witnesses, and judicial economy, the
court has quelled the progress made by the states in prosecuting sex-
ual assault cases.
The Court also announces a new hurdle which it finds in the lan-
guage of the confrontation clause: actual face-to-face confrontation.1 67
The phrase "face-to-face confrontation" cannot be found in the lan-
guage of the sixth amendment.1 68 Moreover, the Court announces no
test nor gives any factors or guidelines to determine when actual
face-to-face confrontation has been achieved.169 Whereas Ohio v.
Roberts1 70 states a preference for face-to-face confrontation, the
Court should always remember that the rights guaranteed by the
confrontation clause are not absolute.17
By holding that the screen violated Coy's right of face-to-face con-
frontation, the majority has become careless and cavalier with their
language. The statutorily-authorized Iowa procedure destroys face-
to-face confrontation between the complaining witness and the crimi-
nal defendant in a manner indistinguishable from a variety of judi-
cially sanctioned procedures.1 72 It would be more accurate to say
that the screen, as well as the other barriers which defeat face-to-face
confrontation, merely curtail the witness's opportunity to make eye
contact with the defendant. Just as the witness may remove her
hand from covering her eyes, she may also look up from the ground,
ask the prosecutor not to stand between her and the defendant while
she testifies, or ask that the protective screen be removed from the
courtroom. As long as she remains in the courtroom, it simply does
165. 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (right of confrontation not violated by out-of-court state-
ments placed before the jury if they bear indicia of reliability).
166. Lilly, supra note 163, at 219.
167. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2802 (1988). Presumably, this new requirement
cannot apply to admissible hearsay if the declarant is unavailable at trial. If the Court
intended the new hurdle to apply to hearsay evidence as well, then the scope of the
confrontation rights have been greatly increased.
168. See supra note 5 for the text of the confrontation clause.
169. Apparently, the use of the screen violated Coy's right of face-to-face confronta-
tion. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802; see supra note 139.
170. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
171. Mattox, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
172. See supra notes 102 and 139.
not matter which device the witness employs to diminish her oppor-
tunity to view the defendant because each achieves the desired effect:
operative reduction of the witness's fear of the defendant.
Moreover, the Court's holding in Coy is further damaging to sixth
amendment jurisprudence because the majority confuses a child vic-
tim's legitimate fear of a criminal defendant with a perceived propen-
sity to lie.173 Whether "there is something deep in human nature
that regards face-to-face confrontation between accused and ac-
cuser," 174 a necessary part of the criminal trial process is independ-
ent of the court's and the prosecution's need to protect child
witnesses in sexual abuse cases. The screen allays a child victim's
fear so that live court testimony becomes possible. The screen does
not function as a vehicle to encourage false testimony. 7 5
Face-to-face confrontation is'achieved when the defendant and the
witness are in the same room because they are able to communicate
effectively with no barriers or restrictions which would deny them
the full opportunity for a clear understanding of what the other is
saying. Under this definition of face-to-face confrontation, Coy was
afforded all of his confrontation rights at trial. However, if an "eye-
ball-to-eyeball" requirement is added to the above definition, Coy's
rights were abridged at trial. Yet, no possible benefit is secured by
this additional requirement.176
Obviously, the prosecutors will not benefit from the "eyeball-to-
eyeball" requirement. This obstacle prevents most of the sexual
abuse cases from ever getting to trial.177 The criminal defendant re-
ceives the only benefit: the constitutional right to intimidate the wit-
ness. The author doubts that this effect is a true manifestation of the
Supreme Court's intent, but this effect is the eventual result of such
a holding.
Coy is an aberration in a long line of confrontation clause cases. As
recently as 1985, in Delaware v. Fensterer,178 the Court stated that
the confrontation clause merely affords "an opportunity for effective
cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in
173. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
174. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2801.
175. The protective screen aids the giving of testimony just as a policeman's firearm
facilitates effective law enforcement. Abuse of either faculty is possible; therefore, the
Court is justified in balancing a criminal defendant's constitutional rights against a
prosecutor's employment of a protective screen or an officer's use of a firearm.
176. This article briefly discussed the trauma which abused children suffer when
exposed to the courtroom environment. See supra note 10. Certainly the addition of an
"eyeball-to-eyeball" requirement will not benefit the abused child witness. In fact, this
hurdle is precisely what keeps many legitimate cases from going to trial. See supra
note 10.
177. See supra notes 2, 4, 10 and 11 and accompanying text.
178. 474 U.S. 15 (1985).
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whatever way and to whatever extent the defense might wish."179 A
criminal defendant should not be afforded a constitutional right to
intimidate a witness.
The majority's ignorance of the language in Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court,180 which states that the policy of "safeguarding the
physical and psychological well-being of a minor is a compelling
one,"18 1 is further evidence that the Coy decision is inconsistent with
current confrontation clause analysis.I8 2 In Globe Newspaper, Chief
Justice Burger remarked that "a state certainly should be able to
take whatever reasonable steps it believes are necessary to reduce
the trauma [suffered by children giving testimony]."l83 "It is difficult
to imagine a more heinous or morally reprehensible crime [than sex-
ual abuse of young children], or one which elicits such a storm of an-
ger and disgust from the public, along with loud demands for
retribution."'1 4 If the opinion in Coy is interpreted to say that legis-
lation aimed at protecting children will not suffice as an important
policy consideration capable of abridging the defendant's confronta-
tion clause rights, a vast array of state law is in peril.1 8 5
Decisions from lower courts throughout the nation have uniformly
held that statutes similar to the Iowa statute in question are not vio-
lative of the defendant's right of confrontation.186 Many of the lower
courts support their decisions with the policy argument that the
179. Id. at 20 (emphasis in original).
180. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
181. Id. at 607.
182. For some reason, the majority in Coy failed to identify the protection of C.B.
and N.C. as an important social policy. Rather, the Court glossed over this issue de-
claring that the determination of "whether any exceptions exist" would be dealt with
at another time. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803 (1988) (emphasis added).
183. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 619 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
184. Note, Should a Two Year Old Take the Stand?, 52 Mo. L. REV. 207, 207 (1987)
(discussing issues presented when the only witness to the crime of child abuse is the
victim of the crime and advancing methods for eliciting child testimony).
185. See aupra note 5. Even though the Iowa statute was not declared unconstitu-
tional, such a narrow interpretation of the Coy opinion could have far reaching, ad-
verse effects. Specifically, none of the child shield laws would be useful and years of
effort and progress will have been needlessly and carelessly erased.
186. Note, McGuire v. State: Arkansas Child Abuse Videotape Deposition Laws-
Room for Improvement, 41 ARK. L. REV. 155 (1989); see, e.g., Appeal in Pinal County
Juvenile Action Nos. J-1123 & J-1124, 147 Ariz. 302, 709 P.2d 1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985);
Chambers v. State, 504 So. 2d 476 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); People v. Johnson, 146 Ill.
App. 3d 640, 497 N.E.2d 308 (1986); State v. Johnson, 240 Kan. 326, 729 P.2d 1169 (1986);
Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986); State v. Daniels, 484 So. 2d 941
(La. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Warford, 223 Neb. 368, 389 N.W.2d 575 (1986); State v.
Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (Law Div. 1984); State v. Vigil, 103 N.M.
583, 711 P.2d 28 (Ct. App. 1985); People v. Henderson, 132 Misc. 2d 390, 503 N.Y.S.2d
existence of a child shield statute is strong evidence of public concern
for the problem of child sexual abuse.18 7 The Supreme Court thus
stands alone in its analysis and resolution of Coy. The Court failed to
see the evidence which aptly demonstrated the magnitude of the pub-
lic's concern for the protection of our children. Specifically:
(1) Shield laws exist in forty-two of the states, not solely in the state of
Iowa.1 8 8
(2) An amicus brief, filed on behalf of the State of Iowa, was offered by the
Attorneys General from thirty-five states. 8 9
(3) The various crimes of sexual abuse of a child are often akin to rape. Our
legislators have been hard at work trying to protect rape victims in much the
same way that Iowa has tried to help child abuse victims. "Perhaps at no time
in history has there been more change in the legal response to the crime of
rape than in the past fifteen years."'1
90
(4) An amicus brief, filed on behalf of the State of Iowa, was offered by
Judge Schudson of the Wisconsin judiciary. The judge is a noted author and
expert on the subject of child victim witness testimony and a competent
jurist.191
Coy's counsel before the Supreme Court was Paul Papak.192 In a
news article discussing the case, before the argument was given to
the Supreme Court, 193 Papak himself felt that the confrontation
clause argument was the weaker of Coy's two claims of error. 9 4 For
proponents of Iowa's case, the most soothing aspect of the holding in
Coy was the failure of the Court to declare the Iowa shield statute
unconstitutional. Perhaps legislators in the several states can find
solace in knowing that their legislation is not per se unconstitutional.
However, as the law stands, a particularized showing of need is neces-
sary before a child shield law may be employed. The amount of evi-
dence in Coy displaying the state's interest and enumerating the
scope of the need to protect the two young girls was held to be insuf-
238 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 366 Pa. Super. 361, 531 A.2d 459
(1987); State v. Cooper, 291 S.C. 351, 353 S.E.2d 451 (1987).
187. The majority in Coy refused to recognize protection of the child victim witness
as an important social policy. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 3.
189. The Attorneys General from the following states contributed to Iowa's cause:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Virgin Islands,
Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming.
190. Note, Rape Victim Confrontation, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 687, 688 (discussing the
validity and the effect of the recent rape shield legislation). "In response, a large ma-
jority of states and the United States Congress have enacted various 'rape shield stat-
utes' designed to limit inquiry into a complaining witness' prior sexual behavior." Id.
at 689; see also FED. R. EVID. 412.
191. See Schudson, supra note 1.
192. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2799 (1988). Mr. Papak is a professor of law at
Iowa State University School of Law.
193. Coyle, Application of Confrontation Clause, A Difficult Issue in Child Abuse
Cases, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 2, 1987, at 1, col. 2.
194. Id, at 10, col. 1.
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ficient to justify a minor infringement on Coy's confrontation
rights.19 5
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's holding in Coy v. Iowa is infected with faulty
reasoning and is inconsistent with contemporary, mainstream con-
frontation clause analysis. The Court's addition to the constellation
of rights embodied in the confrontation clause of the sixth amend-
ment creates more questions than it answers. For example, when is
actual face-to-face confrontation achieved? The new requirement of
actual face-to-face confrontation is not supported by logic nor is it
founded on legal precedent. In addition, conditioning the use of a
protective child shield statute at trial on a particular showing of need
may create an insurmountable burden for states with legitimate, vital
interests to protect.
The Court failed to clearly define what purpose could possibly be
served by granting a criminal defendant the right to actual face-to-
face confrontation while it simultaneously ignored the need to pro-
tect child victim witnesses. The majority's unsupported discussion of
how the new addition to the right of confrontation will facilitate
proper and effective use of cross-examination is illogical and errone-
ous. Coy's addition to this area of the law is not logical, but deviates
from a long line of case law and ultimately adds a right that exists
solely by itself. It appears that the Supreme Court has created a con-
stitutional right of intimidation.196  (
JOHN A. MAYERS
195. The author questions how detailed a particularized showing of need must be
before the Court will allow a minor infringement. Apparently, in cases where a major
infringement is sought, a greater showing of need to protect the victim witness is re-
quired. In Coy, the Supreme Court may have established an insurmountable burden
for the states.
196. At the time of this publication, the Iowa Supreme Court had reviewed the case
in light of the United States Supreme Court's holding. State v. Coy, 433 N.W.2d 714
(Iowa 1988). After excusing the testimony received while the protective screen was in
place, Justice Harris of the Iowa judiciary held that the remaining evidence at trial
merely linked John Coy to the crime. Id. at 715. "The remaining evidence was clearly
not so overwhelming that it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the defined
error did not contribute to the jury's finding of guilt." Id. The case is currently on
remand to the trial court.
©
